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ABSTRACT 
Changes to the ownership and regulatory regimes in developed countries have been 
well explored by many authors, but a hitherto less studied aspect is the need for 
change in the developing world.   This paper reviews one co-author’s recent 
experience in two countries – Barbados and Sri Lanka.   The empirical evidence 
identifies a range of characteristics with a number of key themes emerging.   
Significant amongst these are the roles of politicians in tacitly accepting unsustainable 
positions, combined with an inability of bus company managers to bring their 
influence to bear.   The positions in those two countries are compared with the 
outcomes in the British market, and observations made with regard to the degree that 
expatriate expertise (and possibly personnel) would be able to make an impact.   It is 
concluded that, although such expertise may help in the short term, the key issue is 
one of politicians and managers having the will to confront the problems which face 
them.   A transfer to private sector ownership may facilitate this. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The ownership and regulatory reforms of the British bus industry in the 1980s have 
created the industry which exists today, one in which many of the pre-existing 
problems have been resolved, but one in which, nevertheless, other issues remain.   
Aspects of the British experience have been transferred overseas through an 
interchange of management and consultancy personnel.   Some similar issues are 
evident there, but each market has its own particular characteristics which prevent a 
‘one solution fits all’ model being applied. 
One of this paper’s co-authors, with many years of experience in the British bus 
industry, had the opportunity to work in two such countries and was able to observe 
and, to some degree, influence policy.   It is observations recorded during these 
periods which form the basis of the data used within this paper.   The aim is to 
examine the policies followed in Barbados and Sri Lanka, to identify potential 
solutions to the problems which remain, and to reach conclusions concerning the 
transferability of policies between countries. 
The paper begins with a very brief overview of regulatory and ownership change 
within the British market.   In sequence, the next two sections then provide an 
overview on operations in Barbados and Sri Lanka.   The analysis consists a series of 
comparisons between these two countries with the British experience to allow 
conclusions to be reached. 
Gwilliam (2003), in a previous paper in the Thredbo series, used Sri Lanka as one of 
his examples when examining the implementation of franchising systems in 
developing and transitional economies.   This paper, by virtue of its primary data 
source, places the emphasis at the level of operational management, rather the more 
strategic approach taken by Gwilliam. 
2 BRITAIN 
A summary of developments within the British market over the last 20 years is 
provided in table 1, in order to provide a framework against which the experiences of 
Barbados and Sri Lanka can later be compared. 
Table 1: Bus industry regulatory and ownership developments: 1986 to date 
Pre-1986 issues Regulatory and ownership 
changes 
Outcomes 
Decline of market 
for bus services. 
Rising industry 
subsidy. 
Rising costs of 
service 
provision, with 
resultant 
pressure on 
fares. 
Stringent regulation 
of services and 
fares. 
Lack of incentive 
on operators to 
innovate.  
Replacement of Road Service 
Licensing by statutory 
service registration (outside 
London). 
Subsidy only for services that 
would otherwise cease in the 
free market; must have gone 
through competitive 
tendering. 
Sequential privatisation of all 
sectors of the industry in 
Britain. 
Introduction of route tendering 
in London. 
With very few exceptions, all bus 
companies are now in the 
private sector, with the majority 
being owned by a small number 
of major groups. 
Outside London: 
Continued decline for bus services, 
although with some notable 
exceptions. 
Subsidy reduction, cost reduction 
and fares increases in real terms. 
London: 
Increase in passenger journey 
numbers. 
Fares increases (though more 
recent drop). 
Subsidy reduction and cost 
reduction, though more recent 
increases. 
Sources: DTp (1984: 1-5), DfT (2002: 56-80) 
 
Regulatory and ownership changes in Britain have been examined in a large number 
of previous papers in the Thredbo series.   Preston (1999) provides a synopsis, whilst 
a co-author of this paper presented the then current position of the British industry at 
the last Thredbo conference (Roberts 2003a).    
Endorsing a comment made in the latter paper, the industry has remained extremely 
stable in terms of its ownership form.   In contrast to the volatile ownership change 
pattern between 1986 and (approximately) 2000, ownership changes are now rare 
events.   This stability, and a virtual cessation of competition in all but a few 
locations, has brought about an increased level of investment in new vehicles in 
comparison with that which had been the norm in the first ten years or so after 
deregulation.    
3 BARBADOS 
3.1 Background 
Barbados is a small Caribbean country of only 430km2.   It was a British colony for 
329 years until it gained independence in 1966.   It is a democratic country and, since 
independence, the two main political parties have alternated in government, generally 
serving two consecutive terms, although the present government is in its third term.   
All political parties are left of centre.   The country’s economy has traditionally relied 
on sugar, rum, electronic goods, clothing and cement, which have been exported in 
large quantities.   However, over the last two decades, tourism has grown to become 
the largest earner of foreign currency.   It has a population of 266,000, nearly half of 
whom are domiciled in and around the capital Bridgetown.   Oistins and Speightstown 
are the only other significant centres of population but the island is liberally dotted 
with villages, with the remainder of the population fairly evenly spread.   This paper’s 
co-author was engaged by the government of Barbados between 1997-1999. 
3.2 Bus operations 
The Barbados Transport Board is a state-owned corporation that was formed in 1955.   
It owns in the region of 250 buses, most of which are full-sized single deck vehicles.   
The company has never returned a profit and is currently running annual losses in the 
region of USD13m.   Private sector companies collectively own 228 23-seat 
minibuses and 266 10-seat Route Taxis, which are based on Toyota Hiace vans.   
These operate as buses along predetermined routes.   In addition, there are 1220 taxis 
and 1860 hire cars – extraordinarily high numbers for such a small country.    
There is far less transport legislation and regulation than would be found in a 
developed country, and what does exist is largely or selectively ignored.   However, 
fares are controlled by the government and rarely increase.   Nevertheless, the private 
sector is not financially supported although it is thought that fare levels are 
insufficient to sustain capital and revenue expenditure and without fares increases it is 
thought that vehicle replacement and even maintenance will suffer.   Route Taxis 
already have a poor safety record. 
The private sector operates when it is commercially prudent and its buses often run 
immediately in front of Transport Board buses.   Where each provides two buses an 
hour, this does not produce a fifteen minute frequency but a thirty minute frequency 
with each operator jostling for patronage. 
3.3 Observations 
The Barbados Transport Board is, and since its inception always has been, grossly 
inefficient.   It employs far too many staff, pays well in excess of market rates to 
manual employees, but below market rates to managers.   It has a poor standard of 
vehicle maintenance and is never able to provide a full operational service.   
Decisions are made on a political basis, rather than from a commercial or managerial 
perspective.   Many managers lack suitable qualifications or experience. 
The average lifespan of buses is less than one quarter of what it would be if they were 
maintained properly.   The engineering section is grossly over-staffed, and skill levels 
are low here as well.   At the start of the co-author’s attachment to the company, it 
was observed that there were more buses out of service than in service.   Over one 
hundred buses had been consigned to a status known as “awaiting parts”.   In reality, 
these were unfit ever to return to service again, indeed some of these buses were in 
various states of decomposition and had suffered considerable cannibalisation.   
Traffic management was non-existent and the relationship between the employees and 
their managers could best be described as being in a state of anarchy. 
The World Bank (1984) and Headway Associates (1984) had, some years earlier, 
separately produced reports outlining managerial deficiencies.   In subsequent years, 
reports have been produced by Buchanan (1994), Shorey (1996), and the co-author 
(Greenwood 1998) all of whom have reported similarly on the main deficiencies.   
There seems to be a tendency at governmental level to commission an investigation as 
a delaying tactic, but then show reluctance to accept the advice that has been offered. 
At various times over the last decade, the government has stated that the deficit 
funding was to stop and that the company would have to be managed efficiently, in 
the absence of which it would be privatised.   However, on none of these occasions 
has the government been prepared to take the difficult decisions emanating from such 
a policy and so has allowed things to carry on as they always have. 
3.4 Outcomes 
There is a range of outcomes which have resulted: 
1 Unemployment is lower than it would be if the government-owned corporation 
operated efficiently (although of course it could be maintained that an efficient 
country would attract more foreign investment and so reduce unemployment).   
The government has a certain amount of pride that its state-owned company 
looks after its population by providing employment in this way, and is critical 
of countries elsewhere (eg USA) which it claims do not. 
2 Bus passengers receive a poor level of service. 
3 Taxpayers contribute more to keeping the company afloat than would be the 
case if it were operated more efficiently. 
4 The trades unions exert a considerable amount of power at all levels of the 
organisation, and have influence within the government. 
4 SRI LANKA 
4.1 Background 
Sri Lanka is a 65,000km2 island off the south eastern tip of India.   The country does 
not have any motorways and many of its roads are primitive.   The main roads are 
adequate but are only suitable for slow traffic.   Accordingly, many journeys take four 
or five times as long as similar length journeys would take in Europe.    
Ceylon, as Sri Lanka was known until 1972, was a British colony from 1802 until 
1948 when it became a self-governing dominion within the British Commonwealth.   
It adopted a presidential constitution in 1978.   Most political parties are left of centre 
but political stability has been difficult to achieve.   A civil war existed from 1983 
until 2002, although there remains an uneasy peace. 
The country has a rich diversity of industry and its exports include tea, rubber, 
gemstones, textiles and clothes.   There has been an average of 4% growth over the 
last decade but the country consistently runs massive budget deficits and is reliant 
upon foreign aid.   Per capita income is less than USD2000.   The capital, Colombo, 
has a population of four million and there are significant populations in Kandy, Galle, 
Negombo and Jaffna. 
4.2 Bus operations 
The state-owned bus companies own in the region of 10,000 buses, employ about 
60,000 people and have nearly 100 bus garages.   They sustain large losses and 
without constant state funding would close down immediately.   The vehicles that 
have long been purchased are Indian-built vehicles based on truck chassis, of very 
basic design and poor quality.   They need a high standard of maintenance but, such is 
the standard of premises and facilities, they rarely get this.   The number of buses 
available for service never exceeds 50% of the fleet, and is usually much less than 
this. 
In 1958, the bus industry was nationalised as the Ceylon Transport Board (CTB).   
Over the succeeding years, both operational and financial performance deteriorated 
every year for a variety of reasons.   In 1977, CTB was broken up and ten regional 
companies were formed under the Central Transport Board, a bureaucratic and labour 
intensive organisation that seemed to serve little purpose.   In 1978, the bus industry 
was partially deregulated – fares remaining firmly controlled by the government.   
Deregulation produced an immediate injection of minibuses, most of which were 
owned by single vehicle companies.   These operated only on the most profitable 
routes and at the best times of the day, with the result that the performance of the 
state-owned companies deteriorated further. 
In 1979, the state-owned companies were privatised through “Peopleisation”.   There 
were 93 depots and each was made into a limited company.   50% of the shares in 
these companies were retained by the state, whilst the other 50% were allocated to 
employees free of charge on the basis of length of service.   Though privatised, these 
companies were not allowed to increase fares, they were not permitted to discharge 
any employees and they were required to operate bus services that were not thought to 
be of interest to the private sector. 
The peopleised companies lasted five years, during which time they sustained huge 
losses.   Although they were supposed to have been arms length companies, they were 
insolvent throughout their existence and were kept in business by state funding.   
Throughout these five years, the private sector consolidated.   Their minibuses were 
gradually replaced by standard Indian-built single-decker buses.   The consolidation 
was on the better routes, leaving the peopleised companies with the less lucrative 
routes. 
Further legislation in 1984 took the 93 peopleised companies and formed them into 11 
new companies known as Cluster Bus Companies.   Shares in the old companies were 
taken away from employees without compensation.   In the new Cluster Bus 
Companies, employees were allocated just 10% of the shares with the state-owned the 
other 90%.   Little else changed.   The private sector companies continued to operate 
commercially and the state-owned sector continued to operate inefficiently and 
continued to decline. 
In 2002, a decision was made to introduce private capital into state owning 
companies.   This was largely part of the process of the country emerging from the 
civil war and its need to secure the assistance of agencies such as the Asian 
Development Bank and the World Bank, both of which organisations purport to insist 
upon privatisation as a condition of their funding.   As a result, it was decided that 
organisations, companies or consortia would be invited to enter into Public Private 
Partnerships (PPPs) and to acquire 39% of the shares in one or more of the Cluster 
Bus Companies.   There was only one bidder – a consortium of British and Sri Lankan 
companies, and that consortium was awarded five of the eleven companies, the 
government not being prepared to give all eleven to one bidder.   These five 
companies brought with them 49 bus depots, 2500 buses and 23,500 employees.   The 
PPP policy was very unpopular with the government’s political opponents, who took 
the view that it was intrinsically wrong to sell state assets to foreign investors.   
Despite low fare levels, control of fares was retained by the government.   Fares 
increases were politically sensitive and were to be avoided. 
In early 2003, this paper’s co-author was appointed Group Chief Executive to manage 
the five companies secured by the consortium.   As mentioned later, the tenure was 
short lived as an election in early 2004 brought the opposition into power and the 
cancellation of the agreement with the consortium. 
(An examination of the regulatory change in the Sri Lankan bus market is provided by 
Gwilliam (2003), although this paper was compiled before the governmental changes 
referred to here had made their impact.) 
4.3 Observations 
The following points were apparent within the first two months of the consortium 
assuming control. 
1 All 49 depots taken over by the consortium were in a state of disrepair.   For 
about 20 of them, it would have been cheaper to demolish them and start 
again. 
2 In all but one depot, maintenance facilities were grossly inadequate. 
3 Vehicle maintenance was virtually non-existent; alarmingly, few could see the 
inevitable consequences. 
4 There were probably about 10,000 employees who were not needed. 
5 Between the rank of Managing Director and Depot Manager/Engineering 
Manager, there were over 500 employees, about 300 more than was necessary.   
None had any qualifications, none had any training and many were probably 
political appointees. 
6 Following general elections, about half of all managers were routinely ejected 
from their posts and replaced by members of the successful party.   Those 
ejected were “sent to Japan”, a company expression meaning to be paid, 
without actually having a job. 
7 There were poor disciplinary standards.   Middle managers took the view that 
indiscipline was something with which they had to live. 
8 Less than 50% of scheduled mileage was being operated and everyone at the 
company seemed to find this acceptable. 
9 Companies were required by the government to operate the socially desirable 
routes that the private sector did not want.   As the percentage of mileage 
operated reduced, so these routes became a larger percentage of the total 
operated mileage. 
10 There was a significant, although non-quantifiable, problem with revenue 
abstraction and other employee fraud. 
11 An indication of the state of the finances of the companies was that every 
month the government had to produce cash to pay the wages. 
12 Only six of the 23,000 employees were computer literate. 
4.4 Outcomes  
As with Barbados, there is a range of outcomes which have resulted, to the extent that 
point 1-3 in section 3.4 could almost be repeated word for word here. 
The years of neglect have reduced the companies to the position where they no longer 
represent a challenge to a commercial operator as they are probably beyond economic 
salvation.   The invitation made in 2002 had only one positive enquiry but a similar 
invitation today would likely result in no enquiries being made.   Today the sensible 
commercial decision would be to close the companies down and allow the private 
sector to provide all bus services.   However such a policy would instantly put ten or 
more thousand people out of work and would be politically difficult.   It should be 
noted however that, in one co-author’s view, the situation will continue to deteriorate 
until the companies are unable to provide bus services whilst employing tens of 
thousands of people to do nothing.   Eventually the government will have to take 
action – an action that becomes more unpalatable with every passing day. 
The level of political control exerted over the Sri Lankan bus industry was evident 
from shortly after the consortium assumed control.   A series of injunctions brought 
by employees, purportedly acting on behalf of opposition parties, concerning the 
legality of the privatisation process, effectively prevented the consortium from 
tackling any of the problems which had been identified.   In early 2004, an election 
was called which brought one of the opposition parties to power and the contract with 
the consortium terminated.   Although the decision was of dubious legality, to have 
challenged it through the courts would have been prohibitively expensive, and the 
consortium withdrew.   (It should be noted that Gwilliam’s (2003) paper was drafted 
before these events took place.) 
5 COMPARISONS BETWEEN BARBADOS AND SRI 
LANKA 
5.1 Common issues 
Based on the observations made in sections 3 and 4, there are a number of common 
issues which apply to both Barbados and Sri Lanka.   These are as follows: 
1 Both countries profess to be socialist, and exhibit a desire to protect their 
citizens from the impact of capitalism.    
2 Governments retain control of prices and artificially lower unemployment by 
employing large numbers of people in jobs that would not exist in a free 
market.   This makes it difficult for bus company managers to introduce 
efficiencies.   [In the case of Barbados, the co-author was told that “... 
efficiency is an English concept”.] 
3 Many of the decisions made have been for political, rather than strict business, 
reasons. 
4 Management skills are lacking in many instances. 
5 There is little concern for the impact that policy and management decisions are 
having on the taxpayer or the passenger.   Money is frequently wasted rather 
than difficult decisions being made. 
5.2 Differences 
In contrast, there are two fundamental differences between the two markets. 
1 Barbados, whilst categorised as a third world country, has a thriving economy 
with constant growth over the last decade.   In comparison, Sri Lanka is 
emerging from a painful and extremely costly civil war and its economy is 
fragile. 
2 Both have requested assistance from international funding bodies – such as the 
World Bank and the Asian Development Bank – to help with their 
development, and these bodies have insisted on private sector involvement as 
a condition.   Neither country has in fact followed a privatisation policy – 
Barbados because its economy has improved to the extent that it no longer 
needs World Bank assistance, Sri Lanka because its current government is so 
strongly opposed to the privatisation process. 
6 INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS 
The purpose of this section is to draw out themes from sections 3, 4 and 5 and bring in 
some experiences from the British bus industry. 
6.1 Ownership form 
Roberts (2003b: 221-228) carried out a qualitative comparison of the different bus 
company ownership forms which have existed in the British bus market since the 
initiation of privatisation in 1986.   In summary form: 
Companies owned by their managers and/or employees, and new-start market entrants 
of the kind described in 6.2, find it commercially difficult to develop from their 
‘shoestring’ origins and provide a consistently enhanced level of quality and service 
to the market.   Publicly-owned companies, albeit managed at arms-length from their 
owning authorities, can be effective, but require the combination of supportive 
politicians, competent managers and a relatively competition-free environment for 
maximum benefit. 
Larger enterprises which rely on a Stock Market listing to support their size are 
increasingly driven by the need to deliver particular profit margins rather than being 
able to concentrate on their key public service obligations.   The two aspects are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive – in fact it can easily be argued that a successful 
company, which provides a good service to its customers, is likely to generate good 
profits – but in a declining market often seem to be.   [This may well be an issue in 
Barbados – increasing personal wealth is likely to increase car ownership levels, with 
a negative impact on the bus market.] 
On balance, the best outcome in the British market appears to be the company which 
has achieved a certain amount of critical mass in size, but not to the extent that it 
demands a Stock Market listing.   In many British examples of this, another factor has 
been the personality of the managers involved – those with a high commitment to 
public service and professionalism (see also 6.4).    
The nature of the bus undertakings in Barbados and Sri Lanka are more akin to the 
large public sector conglomerates which existed in Britain prior to the privatisation 
process.   There is significant evidence to show inefficient working practices in such 
organisations: 
“… 100% unionised, hidebound by all sorts of restrictive practices … 
coming out of the state sector, with a legacy going back to nationalisation, 
inefficiencies going back to nationalisation in 1948 … phalanxes of pen 
pushers and bureaucrats and people who didn’t really actually contribute 
very much to the business” (British bus manager, quoted by Roberts 
2003b: 175).    
Such practices were largely eliminated as a result of the privatisation and deregulation 
process, although it has never been possible to apportion the effect between these two 
linked, but distinct, policies. 
6.2 Competition in the market 
The market liberalisation experiences of Barbados and Sri Lanka mirror those of the 
British market in the early post-deregulation period.   Smaller operators appear, 
motivated by short-term profiteering on lucrative routes, described by one British 
manager as “‘Destructive competition’ – creaming off, devaluing quality by using 
clapped out vehicles on a route” (Bus company manager, quoted by Roberts 2003b: 
190).   The argument is that service quality becomes less important than the quest for 
market share.   The British experience is that such conditions do little to encourage 
ridership as overall passenger numbers have fallen in the key markets where this type 
of behaviour is evident. 
By contrast, there is some evidence from Britain to show that well resourced, well-
managed companies can instigate ridership gains.   Many of these situations, however, 
occur in conditions where competition is nil.   There is a paradox whereby the UK 
competition authorities, constrained by the statutory obligation to have regard for 
competition issues at the expense of any wider consideration of transport policy 
issues, have on occasion imposed limits on the degree to the extent that this form of 
market can develop. 
6.3 Political involvement 
The theory that politically elected representatives know best what their constituents 
wish in terms of bus services is a laudable one.   In practice, evidence from Britain, 
and from Barbados and Sri Lanka, has demonstrated that far from ensuring service 
provision in accordance with passengers’ wishes, often political considerations take 
precedence over passengers’ requirements. 
Conceptually, the theory that politicians determine the policies whilst professionals 
are charged with implementing those policies would be fine if each party played their 
respective role.   However, what tends to happen is that politicians are not content 
with their policy-making role but invariably stray into making executive decisions 
which they are not always qualified to make.   Evidence in Britain shows that when 
this concept is enshrined statutorily it does work.   In contrast in Sri Lanka, arms 
length bus companies existed in theory only, as political involvement continued as 
before. 
There is much evidence to suggest that political involvement works best when it is 
confined to the determination of policy through statutes.   In Britain, whilst most bus 
operation is private sector owned and controlled, there remains a political element in 
that there is the ever-present implication that if the private sector fails to meet 
political aspirations then more draconian legislation will be introduced.   It could be 
argued that this keeps commercially orientated bus companies politically attuned 
whilst giving politicians a role. 
6.4 Managerial competence and cross-cultural issues 
A recurring theme when looking at quality in bus companies is the skill and 
competency of bus company managers.   A Thredbo8 paper (Roberts 2003a) took the 
UK government’s then aspirations for the bus industry, one of which was an 
improvement in service quality, and appraised how the market was able to deliver 
against the targets.   Although many of the quantitative measures of service quality 
were already reportedly quite high, there was a qualitative indication that local 
management was lacking in some instances, either due to lack of inherent skill, or the 
destabilising effect of regular management change.   It was concluded there that this 
characteristic was evident across all ownership forms, but that there was a need for 
“... ability, motivation and commitment of local managers to ensure high levels of 
service”. 
The observations from both Barbados and Sri Lanka suggest that this is one of the 
major problems in both markets.   As developing economies, this is not perhaps 
surprising but aspirations to develop must be matched with a commitment to higher 
levels of management competence.   There are perhaps two possible strategies to 
overcome the problem. 
The first is the instigation of a rigorous programme of enhancing the skills of the 
entire workforce, particularly at managerial levels.   There may be reluctance to 
commit limited resources in this area in a changing market.   This was the British 
experience – reformed businesses under newly competitive markets withdrew their 
historic commitment to training until such a time as some form of market stability 
returned. 
The second is the use of overseas managerial experience.   There does appear to be a 
marked reluctance in many markets to the use of non-indigenous labour at managerial 
level.   This is perhaps a particularly sensitive issue in countries which have, until 
relatively recently, been subjected to some form of colonial control.   The experience 
of this paper’s co-author highlighted the problems in this regard, with governments 
eventually turning away from the support which had been offered. 
The poor standards of management found in Sri Lanka and Barbados were a product 
of the system.   Excellent managers will not remain in an environment where, because 
of political constraints, their skills are not used.   In companies where politicians 
make all the decisions, eventually the management team is likely to be of the calibre 
that will be at home in such an environment.   Therefore, recruiting the right people 
and ensuring that they have adequate training and updating of their skills will be 
wasted if those people, realising that their skills are not appreciated, leave the 
industry. 
There are many historical precedents for successful use of expatriate managers and 
these may suggest a possibility for further research in the area.   One example is Hong 
Kong, where the bus industry has developed into one of the most successful systems 
in the world, but one which had been reliant on expatriate managers during its 
formative years.   The African continent is another example, where the BET Group 
had a number of interests, before selling out to local ownership.   Expatriate managers 
can have a role to play in initiating and overseeing the training and skills 
enhancement processes. 
A further possibility for research is the cross-cultural nature of transport ownership, 
and it could be that the case studies described here lend themselves well to such 
analysis.   It is noteworthy that none of the multi-national transport groups have 
expressed interest in such potentially lucrative markets.   The markets may be 
perceived to suffer from politically motivated change (recent events in Sri Lanka 
serve as a cautionary experience in this regard) and the groups, or more specifically 
their funders, are unwilling to take this risk. 
In addition, the markets may, perhaps, be perceived as being too culturally and 
geographically remote to be managed, but examples of diversification failure exist 
within the developed world as well.   Why have a number of the very success British-
based transport groups experienced difficulties in overseas markets (USA, Australia, 
Sweden), whereas otherwise successful organisations such as Connex have performed 
badly in the UK? 
7 CONCLUSIONS 
Overall, it is concluded that the experiences of the British market since the mid-1980s 
provide a partial model which can be applied equally well to developing countries 
such as Barbados and Sri Lanka.    
Bus companies have the ability to be efficient, but only if they are managed properly.   
Current state ownership does not appear to be producing the necessary level of 
efficiency.   The British experience was that benefits accrued to many companies 
through their privatisation, although a public sector company where managerial and 
commercial freedom are permitted can produce good results. 
Endorsing many other findings over the years, an effective regulatory regime needs to 
have quality built into it to avoid the archetypal ‘hit and run’ operator being able to 
exploit lucrative opportunities at the expense of the wider system provider. 
The lack of managerial expertise in developing countries is a major problem.   
Expatriate managers can have a role to play in providing management in the short- to 
mid-term and, through the initiation and implementation of appropriate training, be 
able to have an impact in the longer term as well. 
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